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FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW: UNEVEN
STANDARDS FOR OUR NATION'S HERITAGE
INTRODUCTION
Growing awareness of the value of historic properties has
been evidenced in recent years by a marked upsurge in litiga-
tion in the field of historic preservation. In most of the reported
cases, preservationists have sought a precise determination and
enforcement of the requirements imposed by three statutes
protecting historic resources: the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA);' the National Historic Preservation Act of
1966 (NHPA),' coupled with its implementing Executive Order
No. 115933 and the regulations issued by the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation;' and the transportation legislation
found in both section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act of 19681 and section 18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1968.1
In attempting to delay or stop the wrecker's ball, plaintiffs
have often asked the courts to require that federal agency offi-
cials complete the duties imposed by all three statutes before
going ahead with a proposed project. In many cases the courts
have found only one, and sometimes two, of the laws applicable
even though all were passed to require federal agencies to weigh
the adverse effects of federal actions on historic properties. As
© 1979 by Marilyn Ursu Bauriedel.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1976). This analysis concerns § 4331(b)(4) and § 4332
(2)(C).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976).
3. Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. app.,
at 429 (1976).
4. In February 1973 the Advisory Council promulgated regulations setting forth
a procedure for complying with section 106 of NHPA. 38 Fed. Reg. 5388 (1973). In
January 1974, these procedures were revised to include guidelines to assist federal
agencies in complying with their section 1(3) responsibility under Exec. Order No.
11593, 36 C.F.R. 99 800.1-.10 (1977). The Advisory Council regulations were revised
again and called "regulations" instead of "procedures." The new version took effect
March 1, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 6068 (1979). Where this comment refers to the language
of the old procedures, it is noted, and the text of the new regulations is given.
NHPA created the Advisory Council, 16 U.S.C. § 470(v) (1976), to "advise the
President and the Congress on matters relating to historic preservation; recommend
measures to coordinate activities of Federal, State, and local agencies and private
institutions and individuals relating to historic preservation .. Id. § 470.
5. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
6. 23 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976). Since the wording of this section is identical to
section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, this comment usually refers to
section 4(f). In most reported cases the statute being construed is section 4(f).
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a result, courts have applied varying standards of protection to
threatened historic properties, depending upon which statute,
in the court's opinion, governs the project.
This comment reviews the statutes' varying standards and
the somewhat piecemeal and inconsistent way they have been
applied by different courts, with two purposes in mind: 1) to
clarify, insofar as it is possible, the requirements of each stat-
ute and how agencies may coordinate compliance where more
than one statute applies to a project and 2) to question, for
those concerned with future legislative action, the rationality
of the disparate and unequal treatment historic properties re-
ceive depending upon which court interprets the law, which
statute is found applicable, what kind of federal project is pro-
posed and what each statute means by "historic" property.
To accomplish the first objective, the comment analyzes
the language of each act, beginning with NEPA. It also consid-
ers the implementing regulations as well as the principal judi-
cial decisions of the past decade. To reach the issue of the.
unequal treatment of historic properties, the comment exam-
ines both the uneven application of a particular law by differ-
ent courts and the quite different duties each statute imposes
upon a federal agency undertaking a project affecting an his-
toric property.
FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the
basic federal environmental charter promulgated to insure that
federal agency planning and decisions reflect environmental
values.7 It requires a federal agency to balance environmental
costs with economic and technical benefits when the agency
proposes legislation or undertakes some other "major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." 8 The balancing is accomplished through the prepara-
tion and use of an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
the decision-making process.
Since compliance with the requirements of NEPA can be
viewed as a federal agency's basic duty wherever a major fed-
eral project impacts an historic site, and the requirements of
7. See the declarations of policy in 43 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976) and the statement of
purpose in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations for NEPA, 40 C.F.R. §
1500.1 (1978).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
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the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act can be viewed as
adding duties to those already required, it will facilitate a com-
parison of the three statutes to begin with an explanation of
how NEPA operates to protect historic properties. The require-
ments of the other two statutes will then be compared with
those of NEPA and with each other.
Protection of historic properties is a stated objective of
NEPA. Section 101(b)(4) states:
[Ilt is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment to use all practicable means ... to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and re-
sources to the end that the Nation may ... preserve im-
portant historic, cultural and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible an envi-
ronment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice .... I
The link between this objective and the duties imposed by
NEPA is that the effect of a federal project on an historic
property is one consideration that must be taken into account
when the agency prepares its threshold evaluation of environ-
mental effects and its environmental impact statement (EIS)
as directed by section 102(2)(C) of the Act. 0
The "responsible Federal official" is required "prior to
making any detailed statement . . . [to] consult with and
obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmen-
tal impact involved"" and to prepare an initial evaluation to
determine whether the action is one "significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."' 2 If the agency finds that
the environmental impact will not be "significant," the agency
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1976).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
11. Id.
12. Id. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), the court discussed
the content and purpose of this initial assessment of environmental significance of the
proposed action. The court said that
an agency, in making a threshold determination as to the "significance"
of an action, is called upon to review in a general fashion the same factors
that would be studied in depth for preparation of a detailed environmen-
tal impact statement . . ..
Id. at 835. The "environmental assessment" is also described in the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality Guidelines at 43 Fed. Reg. 25244 (1978), (to be codified in 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9).
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official may issue a finding of no significant impact'3 and pro-
ceed with the project. If, on the other hand, the agency con-
cludes that the effect on the historic property will be signifi-
cant, it must prepare a detailed EIS, which includes a thorough
analysis of costs and benefits of alternatives to the proposed
action."
The major federal action requirement. The criteria for
finding that a federal project is a "major federal action" requir-
ing application of NEPA's protective provisions have been
clearly defined by judicial decisions. However, since NHPA
and section 4(f) use different terms (NHPA speaks of "federal
undertaking,"' 5 and section 4(f) speaks of a "project"'") it is
useful for later comparison to state briefly how much involve-
ment is required to constitute a "major federal action" under
NEPA.
The federal courts have construed "major federal actions"
to include federal funding of state and local projects, such as
urban renewal under the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's loan and capital grant contracts'7 and the
building of dams, 8 highways," and commuter rail systems
20
with money from federal agencies. Direct federal execution of
a project, such as the General Services Administration's con-
struction of a federal bank building, is also viewed as a "major
federal action."
12
Mere receipt of federal funds, however, does not turn a
local project into a "major federal action." In order to require
agency compliance with NEPA, the funds must be designated
for a specific use. For example, the Council on Environmental
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 25234 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972) decided the scope of the discussion of alterna-
tives.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
17. Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977); Save
the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
18. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
19. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Adams, 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978); Stop H-
3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976); Hall County Historical Soc'y v.
Georgia Dep't of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
20. Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations v. Coleman, 437 F.
Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
21. Don't Tear It Down v. General Servs. Administration, 401 F. Supp. 1194
(D.D.C. 1975).
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Quality regulations, issued under authority of NEPA, state
that NEPA is not applicable when state or local governments
undertake projects with general revenue sharing funds.2
Where federal participation has been less direct, the courts
have generally refused to characterize agency involvement with
a local project as a "major federal action" and have thus re-
fused to invoke NEPA's protection for historic buildings. In
Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee,m the court found that the
action of the Controller of the Currency in approving a bank's
change of location, which resulted in the demolition of a his-
toric bank building, did not necessitate compliance with NEPA
because it was not a "major federal action."'"
Another example of federal involvement that was held too
indirect to require an EIS under NEPA occurred in
Miltenberger v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co.2 The Fourth
Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK), a
quasi-federal agency, to halt a private railroad company's dem-
olition of a recognized historic railroad station and hotel. The
court found NEPA inapplicable because AMTRAK, under the
terms of its enabling statute, is not an agency or establishment
of the federal government."6
Another question that arises under NEPA with regard to
"major federal actions" is whether a state can turn a federal
action into a mere state action and thus avoid having to comply
with NEPA. Several states have tried to achieve this result by
bookkeeping maneuvers. The federal courts have consistently
refused to allow the state agencies to do this in order to avoid
preparation of an EIS.Y
22. 43 Fed. Reg. 25245 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17(a)).
23. 534 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 1245. The Controller's action was taken to carry out the terms of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act. But see Billings v. Camp, 4 ENVm. REP.
(BNA) 1744 (D.D.C. 1972) (not officially reported) (approval by Controller of the
Currency of a bank's opening a branch affecting historic and architecturally significant
locale deemed a "major federal action"), vacated as moot, 3 EvM L. REP. 20701 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
25. 450 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 975. The court said categories established by Congress must be honored
despite the fact that AMTRAK is governed by a board of 15, 8 of whom are appointed
by the President. Id. at 975 n.7.
27. In Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), the court held that attempted avoidance
of the environmental legislation by converting a segment of the federal project into a
local one would not be permitted. See Ely v. Velde II, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974). In
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Cut-off for NEPA's requirements. A more significant and
persistent issue in historic preservation cases has been the
question of whether ongoing projects may be required to com-
ply with NEPA when compliance was avoided at the outset.
This has been referred to as the cut-off issue.28 Most courts
have held that NEPA applies throughout the federal involve-
ment as well as at the time of the initial proposal."9 In a number
of cases where an agency neglected its duty under NEPA, the
reviewing court compelled the agency to comply even though
the project had been underway for years. The court in Hart v.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority0 found authority in section
102(2)(C) of NEPA to impose this continuing responsibility.
Section 102 states that Congress requires "to the fullest extent
possible" that the policies and laws of the United States should
be carried out in accordance with the policies of NEPA.3 ' The
Hart court interpreted this section to mean that where an
agency remains meaningfully involved in a project over time,
it continues to have an environmental role and can be required
to submit an EIS until late in the project.2
The fact that the cut-off time for applying NEPA is inter-
preted as occurring late in a project has played an important
role in historic preservation cases. The section of this comment
on NHPA analyzes cases in which courts have held it was too
late to require the agency to follow NHPA procedures but not
too late to require compliance with NEPA-that is, the prepa-
ration of an EIS and a search for ways to mitigate harm to the
historic site.3
The meaning of "historic." Another significant issue in
historic preservation cases is whether the threatened historic
Ely the court held that the state cannot bypass the requirements of NEPA by the
expediency of requesting withdrawal of previously allocated federal block grant funds
for a prisoners' reception center and diverting such federal funds to other projects
within the penal system while constructing the center with state funds. See also Scotts-
dale Mall v. State of Indiana, 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977).
28. WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979).
29. Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89, 90 (D.
Mass. 1972) (intent of NEPA to "take all steps practicable" to protect the environment
supports injunction in HUD project that had been approved seven years earlier while
HUD considers impact on historical buildings). WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d
Cir. 1979); Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977);
Aertsen v. Harris, 467 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1979); Wisconsin Heritages v. Harris,
460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
30. 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
32. 551 F.2d at 1182.
33. See notes 87-106 and accompanying text infra.
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property is one that the statute protects. The language of
NEPA does not limit its protection to sites that have been
given official recognition. Instead, NEPA states that its pur-
pose is to preserve "important historic, cultural and natural
aspects of our national heritage." 3' NEPA itself does not define
"important," but one case indicates the statute extends to
properties which have not yet been officially designated
"historic." In Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat,35 upon plain-
tiffs' showing that University of Idaho researchers had made
archaeological discoveries in the area of a proposed Army Corps
of Engineers project, the court required the Corps to review in
its EIS the impact of the project on the archaeological sites.
Since plaintiffs did not present enough evidence to show that
the sites met the criteria of the National Register of Historic
Places, however, the court refused to order the Corps to meet
the additional requirements of NHPA .3 NEPA's broad stan-
dard of what is historic also aided preservationists in a number
of other cases in which a site had not been declared eligible for
the National Register when federal action began. Like the court
in Libby Rod & Gun Club, the courts in these other cases
required under NEPA, at least limited consideration of the
project's environmental impact and alternative courses of ac-
tion even though they refused to require an agency to under-
take the procedures required by NHPA and its associated regu-
lations.3 7
Substantive protection of historic values. Another issue to
consider regarding NEPA's protection of historic sites is the
likelihood that historic values will be given weight in the final
decision concerning the federal project. In other words, is
NEPA's protection substantive or merely procedural? Another
way to look at this issue is to consider how likely it is that
NEPA's substantive goals of preserving historic structures and
objects on the landscape will be attained if all the required
statutory procedures are followed.
The Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have recognized
that section 101 of NEPA creates not only procedural but also
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1976).
35. 457 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mont. 1978), modified, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979).
36. 457 F. Supp. at 1190. NHPA established a National Register of Historic
Places which applies only to properties listed on or eligible for the National Register.
16 U.S.C. § 470(a) (1976). For the criteria of eligibility see note 55 infra.
37. Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977); Wis-
consin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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substantive rights and duties. 8 In section 101, Congress de-
clared that
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Govern-
ment to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal . . .programs . . . to . . .preserve
important historic . . . aspects of our national heritage."
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers0 the
Eighth Circuit interpreted this passage to mean
that the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure
law . . . . NEPA was intended to effect substantive
changes in decisionmaking. . . . The procedures included
in §102 of NEPA are not ends in themselves. They are
intended to be "action forcing." The unequivocal intent of
NEPA is to require agencies to consider and give effect to
the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not just to file
detailed impact studies which will fill government ar-
chives.4"
Nowhere in NEPA does it say, however, that the agency
shall give historic values greater weight in decision making
than it gives to other factors. What NEPA actually requires is
that the agency, in good faith, balance environmental costs
with technical and economic costs in arriving at a decision.
2
Moreover, when a court is asked to enforce the substantive
duties of NEPA, its review of the agency's compliance is very
limited. 3 The Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have mea-
sured compliance by the standard announced in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 41 Under Overton Park, the
reviewing court will not substitute its judgment about the pro-
ject for the agency's decision. 5 The court will only determine
"whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority"
38. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976) (emphasis added). See note 9 and accompanying
text supra.
40. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
41. Id. at 297-98. See also Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency
Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy
Act, 19 S.D. L. REV. 279 (1974).
42. 470 F.2d at 298, 300.
43. Id. at 300.
44. 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
45. Id. at 416.
[Vol. 20
HISTORIC PRESERVATION
and "whether the decision reached was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with
law."" In determining whether the decision was "in accordance
with law," the court "must decide if the agency failed to con-
sider all relevant factors in reaching its decision, or if the deci-
sion itself represented a clear error in judgment." 7 Rarely have
the courts in a NEPA case overturned an agency decision where
an EIS was reasonably well documented.
To compare the legal requirements of NHPA with those of
NEPA, it is necessary to turn first to the Congressional Decla-
ration of Policy in NHPA and to sections 101(a)(1) and 106 of
that Act. In the preamble to the Act, Congress declared that
the "historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should
be preserved as a living part of our community life and develop-
ment in order to give a sense of orientation to the American
people."48
Pursuant to the above policy, section 101 (a)(1) established
the National Register of Historic Places, defined as a "register
of districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant
in American history, architecture, archeology, and culture.""
Section 106 requires that where a "federal or federally assisted
undertaking" or "federal licensing of any undertaking" is con-
templated, the responsible agency official
shall prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Fed-
eral funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of
any license . . . take into account the effect of the under-
taking on any district, site, building, structure or object
that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National
Register.
Furthermore, the head of the agency "shall afford the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation. . . a reasonable opportunity
to comment with regard to such undertaking."'"
Executive Order No. 11593 and the Advisory Council
Regulations. Federal agency responsibilities under section 106
are further defined in the regulations of the Advisory Council.52
These regulations set forth procedures to be followed by the
46. Id. at 415-16.
47. Id. at 416.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976).
49. Id. § 470(a).
50. Id. § 470(f).
51. Id.
52. 44 Fed. Reg. 6068 (1979) (to be codified in 36 C.F.R. §§ 800-800.15).
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agency to "take into account the effect"" on the property. They
also define what is meant by the Advisory Council's
"reasonable opportunity to comment"'" on a proposed under-
taking. In addition, other regulations list the criteria a site
must meet to be eligible for the National Register.55
The Advisory Council regulations were promulgated in re-
sponse to Presidential Executive Order No. 11593 of May 13,
1971." The Executive Order was issued in furtherance of the
policies of NEPA and NHPA57 and instructed federal agencies,
in consultation with
the Advisory Council ... , [to] institute procedures to
assure that Federal plans and programs contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of non-federally owned
sites, structures and objects of historical, architectural or
archeological significance. 8
The regulations promulgated in 1974, were intended to serve as
guidelines for the agencies until they adopted their own proce-
dures.5'
Federal agency compliance with Executive Order No.
11593, was not uniform. Prominent among agencies slow to
respond was the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
53. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
54. Id.
55. 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1978):
The criteria were issued by the Secretary of the Interior and are set forth
as follows: "The quality of significance in American history, architecture,
archeology, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures,
and objects of State and local importance that possess integrity of loca-
tion, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association,
and:
(1) That are associated with events that have made a significant
contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or
(2) That are associated with the lives of persons significant in our
past; or
(3) That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period,
or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that
possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distin-
guishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; or
(4) That have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information impor-
tant in prehistory or history."
56. Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. app.,
at 429 (1976).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(b) (2) (1978). The new regulations delete this reference since
the courts have interpreted the regulations as binding on federal agencies. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 6073 (1979).
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ment (HUD). Noting HUD's failure to issue its own regula-
tions, one court concluded that HUD by its delinquency, had
"chose[n] to incorporate the Advisory Council regulations as
part of its own internal procedures" 0 and, the court held, HUD
was consequently bound to follow these procedures." Other
courts have, under different facts, similarly interpreted the reg-
ulations as mandatory procedures for any federal undertaking
with a potential impact on historic properties.2
The Advisory Council regulations impose three duties on
federal agencies engaged in projects that may affect an historic
property. The first is to identify properties within the area of
the project's potential impact "that are included in or eligible
for inclusion in the National Register." 3 This task must begin
"at the earliest stage of planning or consideration of a proposed
undertaking" or as "early as possible and in all cases prior to
agency decision concerning an undertaking."4 Compliance re-
quires that the agency official consult with the State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) and apply the National Register
criteria "to all properties possessing historical, architectural,
archeological, or cultural value." 5 If the agency official deter-
mines that a property appears to meet the National Register
criteria, or if it is questionable whether the criteria are met, the
official must formally request an opinion from the Secretary of
the Interior as to the property's eligibility for the National
60. Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1338 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
61. Id.
62. Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D. Haw. 1977) (implied right of action
under 36 C.F.R. Part 800), rev'd on other grounds, 13 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1382 (9th
Cir. 1979); Hall County Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ga. 1978); Don't Tear It Down v. General Servs. Administration, 401 F. Supp.
1194 (D.D.C. 1975).
63. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (1978). The new regulations, effective March 1, 1979,
state,
It is the responsibility of each Federal agency to identify or cause to be
identified any National Register or eligible property that is located within
the area of the undertaking's potential environmental impact and that
may be affected by the undertaking.
36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (1979).
64. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (1978). The new regulations state,
As early as possible before an agency makes a final decision concerning
an undertaking and in any event prior to taking any action that would
foreclose alternatives or the Council's ability to comment, the Agency
Official shall take the following steps . . .
36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (1979).
65. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (1978). The role of the State Historic Preservation Offi-
cer is further defined in the new regulations. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1979).
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Register." The Secretary's opinion respecting eligibility is con-
clusive .
The second responsibility of the agency official is to deter-
mine if the project will have an effect on eligible properties."
And third, the official must determine whether or not the effect
will be "adverse"." If an adverse effect is found, or if the Exec-
utive Director of the Advisory Council does not accept the
agency's determination of no adverse effect, the agency official
must proceed with what is termed the Advisory Council's
"consultation process". 7" During the consultation process, any
of the consulting parties (the Executive Director, the State
Historic Preservation Officer or the agency official) may re-
quest an on-site inspection of the property7 and a public meet-
ing to give interested persons an opportunity to express their
views and suggest alternative courses of action.7"
The three-party consultation always includes a considera-
tion of feasible and prudent alternatives in order to avoid the
adverse effect.73 If no agreement on an alternative project or
plan is reached, the three must attempt to reach an agreement
on ways to minimize the impact on the historic property while
allowing the project to proceed.74 If any agreement is reached,
a thirty-day review period follows. During this time the Advi-
sory Council may review the agreement or take no action.75 If
no action is taken, the agreement becomes final and the project
66. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a)(3) (1979).
67. Id.
68. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1) (1979).
69. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(2)(1979). The criteria of adverse effect appear at section
800.3(b), as follows:
generally, adverse effects occur under conditions which include but are
not limited to:
(1) Destruction or alteration of all or part of a property;
(2) Isolation from or alteration of the property's surrounding environ-
ment;
(3) Introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric elements that are out
of character with the property or alter its setting;
(4) Neglect of a property resulting in its deterioration or destruction;
(5) Transfer or sale of a property without adequate conditions or restric-
tions regarding preservation, maintenance, or use.
36 C.F.R. § 800.3(b) (1979).
70. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(d) (1979).
71. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(b)(2) (1979).
72. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(b)(3) (1979).
73. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(b) (1979).
74. Id.
75. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c)(2) (1979).
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proceeds." If no agreement has been reached by the consulting
parties to avoid or mitigate the effect on the historic property,
the Advisory Council has' a thirty-day period in which to con-
sider the case and make recommendations or to take no action
and let the project proceed.77
The Advisory Council includes the highest officials of
twelve federal agencies as well as the Secretary of the Smith-
sonian Institution, the Architect of the Capitol, the Chairman
of the Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities, the Chair-
man of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Presi-
dent of the National Conference of State Historic Preservation
Officers and twelve members appointed by the President from
outside the federal government." The outside members are cit-
izens with experience and expertise in the field of historic pres-
ervation. Because of its high-level composition, the influence
of the Council may have an important bearing on whether fed-
eral agencies treat NHPA as merely a procedural formality or
a serious search for an alternative that does the least damage
to historic and cultural values. The prestige and credibility of
the Council can be important factors in securing agency adop-
tion of the Council's recommendations. Agencies, however, are
not legally required to implement the recommendations."
Overlapping statutory duties. An important issue in com-
76. Id.
77. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.6(b)(7), (d)(1)-(2) (1979).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 470(i) (1976). The agency members are: the Secretaries of Inte-
rior; Housing and Urban Development; Commerce; Defense; Treasury; State; Agricul-
ture; Health, Education and Welfare; and Transportation; the Attorney General; the
Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality; and the Administrator of the
General Services Administration.
79. The Advisory Council annual report for 1973-74 contained the optimistic
conclusion that "[in most cases, this staff level negotiation process results in a
mutually acceptable solution to both preservationists and Federal project planners."
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1973-74 (1975). In Fiscal Year 1974 the Council re-
ported that of 331 cases in which action was completed, 145 ended in Memoranda of
Agreement among the consulting parties, and "186 were closed by a determination of
no Federal involvement, a finding of no adverse effect to the property, or withdrawal
of the project." Id. at 14.
In Fiscal Year 1975 there were sixty Memoranda of Agreement. In five of those
cases it was necessary to agree to the destruction of buildings listed on or eligible for
the National Register, and in eight cases it was necessary to agree to relocating an
historic building that otherwise would have been demolished. In all the other cases
closed, projects were modified to avoid adverse effect on the historic properties or to
permit only slight impairment. The Council added, "On rare occasions, the public
interest of preservation was found to outweigh the project's benefits, and the project
was cancelled." Id. at 15.
19801
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
paring the protections afforded by NEPA and NHPA is the
extent to which their statutory duties overlap. The Advisory
Council regulations direct that where both NEPA and NHPA
apply, the agency undertaking the project shall coordinate all
the steps taken to fulfill NHPA obligations with preparation of
the EIS required by NEPA.80 The Advisory Council anticipates
preparation of one document to meet the requirements of both
statutes."
Federal undertaking. In comparing the statutory language
of NHPA section 106 with the language of NEPA section
102(2)(C), another issue that arises is whether a "federal un-
dertaking" or "federal license" under NHPA2 is the same as a
"major federal action" under NEPA. In general, the courts
have held that the kind of federal involvement which requires
an EIS is the same as that which requires the agency to com-
plete the additional procedures of NHPA. s Under NHPA, just
as under NEPA, where federal agency involvement is indirect,
80. 36 C.F.R. § 800.9 (1979).
81. Id. Despite the directives to coordinate compliance with NEPA obligations,
however, the Advisory Council regulations speak of the "separate responsibilities" of
NHPA and the Executive Order as compared with NEPA. Id. The regulations state
that "agency obligations pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act and Exec-
utive Order 11593 are independent from NEPA requirements and must be complied
with even when an environmental impact statement is not required." Id.
It seems inconsistent that a threshold finding of no significant environmental
effect under NEPA would result in any duties under NHPA. However, Hall County
Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978), is a
case in which the federal agency issued a finding that no EIS was required under
NEPA-but was required by the court to complete the separate duties of NHPA. In
this case the Federal Highway Administration made no independent effort to assess
the potential environmental effects under NEPA. Instead the agency relied on a report
prepared by the Georgia Department of Transportation. The court was disturbed by
this "blind reliance . .. . upon the state's determination and findings." Id. at 751. The
court did not bother, however, to require the agency to submit its own EIS, but focused
on the Federal Highway Administration's failure to make an effort under the Advisory
Council regulations to identify properties within the area of the project's potential
impact that were included in or eligible for the National Register. The injunction was
granted predicated upon noncompliance with NHPA. The court held that the statute
requires that "the determination of effect, adverse effect, or no effect by the appropri-
ate federal agency official be an independent one, and not simply a 'rubber stamp' of
the state's work." Id. at 752. But see Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), clearly indicating that NEPA also requires
that EIS preparation be a nondelegable responsibility.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
83. Federal agency action in the cases cited in notes 17-19 supra met the criteria
of "federal undertaking" or "federal license" under section 106 of NHPA as well as of
"major federal action" under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
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courts have not required the agency to follow statutory proce-
dures."'
On the related issue of whether a state may avoid the
duties imposed by the federal historic preservation statutes by
shifting the federal funds to other projects and using state
funds, one court has handled the problem the same way it has
been decided under NEPA. In Ely v. Velde II,8 the state of
Virginia planned to use funds from the federal Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) to construct a prison-
ers' facility. The construction would have impacted the Green
Springs Historic Area, which had been listed on the National
Register. In order to avoid the requirements of NHPA, the state
diverted the LEAA funds to other projects within the state
penal system and planned to construct the center with state
funds. The court held that if the state failed to consider the
effect on the historic district as required by NHPA, the state
could not use the federal money for this or any other project
but must return the funds to the federal government.88
The "cut-off" issue. The next consideration under NHPA
is the critical issue of whether a court may require an agency
to stop in the middle of a project to comply with NHPA when
the agency failed to do so at the outset. The court's treatment
of the cut-off issue has been, for the last decade, one of the most
significant differences between NEPA and NHPA. In several
cases, when courts have at least found authority to compel
agency compliance with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, they have
84. Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee, 534 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976); Miltenber-
ger v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 450 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1971). Weintraub v. Rural
Electrification Administration, 457 F. Supp. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1978), illustrates a type of
indirect federal funding which was not enough to come within the terms of "federal
undertaking" under NHPA. In Weintraub an electric cooperative borrowed funds from
the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) to construct its new building. The fact
that the new building would house a restaurant and other commercial tenants as well
as the offices of the cooperative created a need for a parking lot next door. To make
room for the parking lot, the co-op proposed demolishing a historic building listed on
the National Register. In denying any agency responsibility under NHPA to solicit
Advisory Council comments on the effects of this project on the building, the court
reasoned that no federal funds were to be used directly for the demolition; no federal
agency authorized the money for demolition; the federal action was too indirect; and
Congress did not intend the NHPA to reach every effect of federal spending. Moreover,
in a statement similar to the court's reasoning in Edwards, the Weintraub court said
that the REA's requirement that all borrowers receive the agency's approval for plans
to construct their headquarters and garages does not constitute a "license" within
NHPA. 457 F. Supp. at 92.
85. 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974).
86. Id. at 254.
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held that it was too late to impose the additional duties of
NHPA.
The cases that have been the most difficult legally have
involved urban renewal projects funded by HUD with plans
calling for demolition of historic buildings. In most cases, mas-
sive planning and funding were approved in the 1960's before
NEPA and NHPA became law and before citizens realized the
potential impact of the projects on historic buildings in the
project area. In each case, when the impact became known, the
citizens had the buildings placed on the National Register and
sued to stop the project until the agency complied with NHPA
and NEPA.
In these situations the language of NHPA section 106 was
interpreted in one of two ways. One line of cases held that the
agency had no duty under NHPA unless the historic property
affected had been included in, or declared eligible for, the Na-
tional Register at the time the approval of the expenditure of
federal funds was being considered.87 The other interpretation
has been that there was no duty if the property was not in-
cluded or declared eligible at the time project plans or
amendments to plans were "authorized and the resulting loan
and capital grant was entered.
88
To maximize the utility of the latter interpretation, courts
have struggled to find an amendment to the urban renewal
plan (or a decision as to disposition of the property) that took
place after the site was listed on the National Register. If an
amendment could be found, the court could require an agency
to delay demolition of a building while the agency officials
weighed alternatives and consulted with the Advisory Council.
But in all of the cases, the courts were unable to find any
amendments that had been added after the buildings became
eligible, and it was not possible under this rationale to require
HUD to comply with section 106.81
When courts finally took cognizance of the issuance of the
1974 Advisory Council regulations, however, a door was opened
87. Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1335 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
88. South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969)
(emphasis added). See also St. Joseph Historical Soc'y v. Land Clearance for Redevel-
opment Auth., 366 F. Supp. 605, 609 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The historic building ultimately
destroyed to make way for urban renewal was the eastern terminus of the Pony Ex-
press.
89. See Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977);
Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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to extending obligations of NHPA to cases in which the historic
property had been declared eligible after all the amendments
to the federal agency plans had been approved and the project
was well underway. In 1975, in Save the Courthouse Commit-
tee v. Lynn,'" a court for the first time read section 1(3) of
Executive Order No. 11593 together with the regulations and
concluded that even if the language of section 106 of NHPA did
not apply, HUD was legally bound to follow the Advisory
Council procedures since it had not set up its own. In reaching
this conclusion, the district court considered section 800.3(c) of
the Advisory Council regulations which defines "undertaking"
to include not only new but also "continuing projects and pro-
gram activities. . . supported in whole or in part through Fed-
eral contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of fund-
ing assistance.""2 Thus, even though the entire urban renewal
program for White Plains, New York had been approved ear-
lier, the court saw the proposed demolition of the Westchester
County Courthouse as a further "undertaking" within the
meaning of these regulations. The court reasoned: "Unlike Sec.
106 of NHPA the applicability of the regulations is not ex-
pressly linked to the timing of the approval of the Federal
expenditures."" Instead, according to the court, the regula-
tions apply as long as the agency has not made a final
"decision" about the property. Looking at section 800.3(g) the
court found "decision" defined as "the exercise of agency au-
thority at any stage of an undertaking where alterations might
be made in the undertaking to modify its impact upon historic
and cultural properties."" From this definition the court rea-
soned that the regulations were meant to apply "at any time
when it was still possible to effect changes in the undertaking
in order to circumvent an adverse impact.""
90. 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. Section renumbered in new regulations and found at 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)
(1979).
92. 408 F. Supp. at 1339.
93. Id. (emphasis added). Section renumbered in new regulations and found at
36 C.F.R. § 800.2(h) (1979). The section now reads,
"Decision" means the exercise of or the opportunity to exercise discre-
tionary authority by a Federal agency at any stage of an undertaking
where alterations might be made in the undertaking to modify its impact
upon National Register and eligible properties.
94. 408 F. Supp. at 1339. The new regulations contain a new section aimed at
alerting an agency to its ongoing duty and at preventing resources discovered in the
middle of a project from being adversely affected. As the Council describes the in-
tended impact of the new regulation, the section "applies only to those resources
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Applying the above standard in Save the Courthouse, the
district court declared it was not too late because "the pro-
posed demolition of the courthouse had not reached such a
plateau of implementation that reassessment of the action by
all concerned would be wholly impracticable." ' 5 Since no final
decision had been made by the agency concerning disposition
of the property, the court felt justified in issuing an injunction
delaying the project while HUD gave the Advisory Council the
opportunity to review and explore with the agency an alterna-
tive to demolition.
The foregoing application of the regulations may seem
similar to the test applied to ongoing projects under NEPA. As
noted earlier, a number of courts have held in cases involving
similar HUD-funded urban renewal projects that NEPA ap-
plied to continuing federal agency involvement even several
years after the project was underway." However, in a 1978
HUD case, Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris,7 a federal dis-
trict court decided that the project had reached the point where
it was too late for NHPA but not too late for NEPA. In that
case, a contract had been signed between the urban renewal
agency and Marquette University much earlier in the project
promising to demolish an historic mansion on the university
campus and to deliver the land, cleared of the building, to
Marquette at a specified date in the future. As was typical of
the other HUD cases, citizens had the property placed on the
National Register long after the HUD capital grant and loan
had been approved for the whole urban renewal project. The
court held that it was too late for reconsideration of the fate of
the mansion under the Advisory Council regulations. The sign-
ing of the contract in Wisconsin Heritages was held to be an
irrevocable "decision" about the property, leaving no room for
reconsideration under NHPA or its regulations. 8
discovered during construction that meet the National Register Criteria" and requires
that "an agency make reasonable efforts to avoid foreclosing options while the Coun-
cil's comments are being sought." 44 Fed. Reg. 6067, 6071 (1979). The section does not,
however, require a mandatory halt to construction because commentators on the draft
regulations objected to the delays this would cause. Id.
95. 408 F. Supp. at 1339. See also Committee to Save the South Green v. Hills,
7 ENVIR. L. REP. 20061 (D. Conn. 1976).
96. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
97. 460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
98. Id. at 1124. The Wisconsin Heritages court said,
The key to the applicability of [the regulations] in this case is whether
a decision was made by HUD subsequent to. . . the date on which the
206 [Vol. 20
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The court held, however, that it was not too late to require
an EIS under NEPA to consider methods to mitigate the ad-
verse effect and granted a two-month delay while HUD pre-
pared an EIS seeking a plan for preserving the mansion at
another location." Quoting from Jones v. Lynn, I0 the court
said,
While it may be fruitless to apply procedural protections
afforded by NEPA to a project which has been so far termi-
nated to preclude any change in plans, the only correct
interpretation would seem to be that if the requirements
of the Act can be feasibly applied-even if the project in
question was begun prior to the enactment of NEPA-then
they should in fact be applied.''
The Wisconsin Heritages court found that, even after the
conditional closeout of bank accounts for the urban renewal
project three years earlier, HUD's control over the remaining
funds for demolition of the mansion was sufficient "to impose
further responsibilities under NEPA."'' 0 The court recognized,
however, "that in applying NEPA to an ongoing urban renewal
project, consideration must be given to vested rights."'' 0 It fur-
ther stated that "Marquette's contractual right to the mansion
site cleared of improvements precluded HUD from considering
as a NEPA alternative the retention of the mansion at its pres-
ent site."'' The agency could, however, give meaningful con-
sideration to "relocation of all or part of the mansion.'
Had it not been for the vested contract right, the court in
Wisconsin Heritages may have invoked NHPA and ordered
HUD to consult the Advisory Council. The fact that the court
was impressed with the reasoning in Save the Courthouse v.
Lynn and carefully considered the "decision" point language of
the regulations'" indicates that, but for the existing contract
mansion became eligible for inclusion in the national register, thereby
requiring that the regulations be followed.
Id.
99. Id. at 1127.
100. 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
101. Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. at 1125 (quoting Jones v.
Lynn, 477 F.2d at 889).
102. 460 F. Supp. at 1126.
103. Id.
,104. Id.
105. Id. at 1127. The agency was given two months to prepare an EIS. Advisory
Council assistance might have been helpful in view of this short time period.
106. Id. at 1124.
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with Marquette, the court might have been willing to give a
broader reading to NHPA. The most recent HUD urban re-
newal case addressing the cut-off issue, WATCH (Waterbury
Action to Conserve Our Heritage, Inc.) v. Harris,'07 is further
evidence of a new trend. It heralds the end of the major differ-
ence between the protections of NEPA and NHPA on the cut-
off issue.
In WATCH v. Harris the city of Waterbury, Connecticut
adopted an urban renewal plan to rehabilitate 20.6 acres of its
downtown area. In 1973, the Waterbury Urban Renewal
Agency (WURA) signed a loan and capital grant contract to
receive from HUD about twenty-four million dollars over the
life of the project. The plan called for eighty-three buildings to
be demolished and replaced with high-rise offices and commer-
cial buildings. Under the contract, as under other HUD urban
renewal contracts, the work was to be done in phases, each of
which required HUD's permission. The contract was executed
before any affected properties were listed on the National Reg-
ister-indeed, as in some previous cases, before the local citi-
zenry was aware that some buildings might be eligible. When
the public awakened HUD to the historic value of the area and
the eligibility of at least one building for the National Register,
HUD failed to comply with NHPA or NEPA. 05 WATCH sued
to enjoin further redevelopment until HUD prepared an EIS
and consulted the Advisory Council. The district court agreed
with WATCH that an EIS was needed, but as to NHPA, it
relied on the older cases and interpreted the cut-off date to be
the date the federal contract was signed. On appeal, however,
the Second Circuit held that NHPA still applied and HUD
must consult the Advisory Council.
The Second Circuit concluded that where a contract with
a federal agency provides for subsequent federal approval of
specific expenditures in stages or phases and the initial con-
tract has only authorized the expenditures in a preliminary
fashion, NHPA applies "until the agency has finally approved
the expenditure of funds at each stage of the undertaking."'' 09
107. 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979).
108. The buildings in the area are of a " 'classic turn-of-the-century main street
type,' representing an eclectic collection of architectural styles including, Renaissance
revival, Richardsonian romanesque, Greek revival, and Italianate." Id. at 314. The
H.H. Peck carriage house was declared eligible for the National Register on February
7, 1978. Members of WATCH had asked for a determination with regard to all the
commercial buildings in the project area. Id. at 315.
109. Id. at 319.
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After a long and careful review of the language of the statute
and its legislative history, the court reasoned that, although
Congress did not consider the narrow cut-off issue, it did intend
to provide a meaningful review of historic resources when a
federal project was planned. The opinion states, "We believe
that our interpretation provides a far more meaningful review
than the strict cut-off interpretation.""0
As additional justification, the court of appeals noted that
the Advisory Council, the agency charged with executing the
act, had interpreted NHPA as applying on a stage-by-stage
basis."' The court was impressed with the fact that Congress
did not change the 1974 Advisory Council procedures when it
amended the act in 1976."1
A further significant difference between the WATCH v.
Harris opinion and the other HUD cases is the court's sensitiv-
ity to the the contemporary needs of the national preservation
program. This is the first opinion to examine preservation pol-
icy and problems in depth and to fashion a decision sympa-
thetic to current needs. The court was cognizant that an ade-
quate inventory of properties is the key to preserving the signif-
icant ones and that it has been and continues to be very easy
to overlook important resources and lose them to " 'so-called'
progress""' because of a time lag in identifying and listing
properties. The court identified the following causes for the
lag." 4 First, widespread interest in local historic preservation
has only developed in recent years, partly because NHPA
shifted the focus from recognizing and preserving nationally
significant properties to identifying and saving properties of
local merit. Second, state historic preservation offices are inad-
equately funded and understaffed to do the ambitious surveys
of resources they are charged with completing. Third, they face
a nearly impossible backlog of cases presented for identifica-
tion and determination of Register eligibility. Finally, these
agencies have had to use most of their monies for" 'bricks and
mortar' preservation of already inventoried properties in immi-
nent danger of loss.""'
110. Id. at 324.
111. Id. at 324.
112. Id. at 325. NHPA was amended to increase funding for preservation and to
include within its protections buildings "eligible" for the National Register as well as
those already "listed". 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
113. 603 F.2d at 325.
114. Id. at 314.
115. Id. at 314 n.6. The expectation of the Advisory Council in 1975 was that a
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The court recapitulated its reasoning as follows:
The sum and substance of all this is, we think, a congres-
sional purpose, expanding over the years, to make certain
that federal agencies give weight to the impact of their
activities on historic preservation. Throughout Congress
has recognized that it is necessary to identify the proper-
ties that are of state, community or local significance, and
this was one of the major purposes of the 1966 act itself.
The problems of identification were and remain considera-
ble, as the 1976 legislative history recognizes. One would
suppose that Congress, having these problems in mind, did
not intend to adopt a strict cut-off date, at least as to grant
and loan- contracts such as this one where the federal
agency gives its final approval to the expenditure of federal
funds only in stages, and § 108(B) of the contract explains
that one of the purposes of phased approval is to ensure
that the local agency does not take any step which, in
HUD's opinion, might violate federal law."'
In summary, courts have been more willing to impose legal
responsibilities under NEPA than they have been under NHPA
when the project is well underway. Recent interpretations of
NHPA, however, are bringing it more in line with NEPA re-
garding an agency's continuing responsibility. The Second Cir-
cuit opinion in WATCH v. Harris, with its emphasis on the
underlying purposes of NHPA, is likely to be an influential
precedent in any forthcoming urban renewal cases and perhaps
other historic preservation cases as well.
Substantive v. procedural protection. The final issue to
consider in comparing NHPA and NEPA is the extent to which
NHPA and its regulations provide substantive as well as proce-
dural protections for historic properties. The issue of whether
the declared policy of NHPA to preserve historic resources im-
poses enforceable duties upon the agencies has not been raised
by the cases as it has under NEPA. The decisions under NHPA
have focused on whether the Advisory Council regulations
apply and whether agencies have adequately followed them. It
is difficult to ascertain from the judicial decisions how much
total in excess of 50,000 buildings would eventually be listed on the National Register.
By 1975 about 10,000 had been listed. NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION Acr OF 1966;
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION TO THE SENATE COMMITIEE
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 94-367, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 27-28
reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2455, 2456.
116. 603 F.2d at 325.
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the additional review procedures under NHPA add to the pro-
tections afforded by NEPA. What can be said about the out-
side review afforded by the Advisory Council, a key difference
between NHPA and NEPA, is that this body of high ranking
officials and preservation experts offers recommendations and
approaches to preservation that the lead agency might overlook
because of its lack of expertise and self-interest in seeing the
project completed. " '
Protection of Historic Sites Under DOT Act Section 4(f)
Where historic properties lie in the path of a federally
subsidized highway or other transportation project,"' the fed-
eral agency involved must meet a tougher standard of protec-
tion of historic properties. As a preliminary step, the agency
will no doubt have to prepare an EIS and may have to under-
take the duties required by NHPA if the site or structure is a
National Register property or a likely candidate for the Na-
tional Register. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, section
18(a)"9 and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,
section 4(0120 contain further duties, however. Both statutes
mandate that a "special effort" be made to preserve historic
properties located in the path of a federal transportation pro-
ject. They also require, in identical provisions, that the Secre-
tary of Transportation "shall not approve any program or pro-
ject which requires the use of . . any land from an historic
site of national, State, or local significance" as determined by
the federal, State or local officials who have jurisdiction over
117. HUD's actions in WATCH show how likely it is, even with public preserva-
tion awareness at a new high, that the self-interested agency doing its own environmen-
tal assessment will overlook historic resources. HUD had called upon the Secretary of
the Interior to make a determination of whether any of the buildings in the project area
met the National Register criteria. This was technical compliance with the regulations.
When HUD did not receive a reply from the Secretary after several months of waiting,
however, HUD officials permitted the project to proceed and allowed the local redevel-
opment agency to sign demolition contracts. Id. at 315.
! 118. When the Department of Transportation (hereinafter cited as DOT) was
established or within a short time thereafter, the following agencies became attached
to DOT: Federal Highway Administration, 49 U.S.C. § 1652(e)(1) (1976); Federal
Railroad Administration, 49 U.S.C. § 1652(e)(1) (1976); Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, 49 U.S.C. § 1652(e)(1) (1976); the Coast Guard, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(a) (1976); the
Saint Lawrence Seaway Corporation, 33 U.S.C. § 981 (1976) and the Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, 49 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). Section 4(f) applies to the
activities of all these agencies.
119. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976).
120. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
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these properties unless "(1) there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program in-
cludes all possible planning to minimize harm" to the prop-
erty. 2
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court gave the follow-
ing interpretation of section 4(f) in the landmark case, Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 122 The Court upheld a citi-
zen's right to review of the Secretary of Transportation's deci-
sion that no feasible and prudent alternative route exists. 23
The Court declared that an alternative which avoided using the
protected land would be considered "feasible," and therefore
must be adopted, if it would be compatible with sound engi-
neering practices. The nonharmful alternative would be con-
sidered "prudent," and therefore must be adopted, unless there
were "truly unusual factors" present in a particular case or the
"cost or community disruption resulting from taking a differ-
ent route reached extraordinary magnitudes.' ' 2 The court
added that the Secretary cannot approve destruction of pro-
tected lands "unless he finds that alternative routes present
unique problems. 12 5
The standard of section 4(f) as interpreted in Overton
Park, is clearly higher than that of NEPA and NHPA. On its
face, section 4(f) offers substantive protection to historic prop-
erties beyond that offered by the other two statutes. In balanc-
ing factors to arrive at a decision about a project, an agency is
required by section 4(f) to give greater weight to historic and
cultural values than to other factors.' This is not the case
121. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976). Since section 4(f) per-
tains to all projects of the Department of Transportation, including the highway pro-
jects to which section 18(a) applies, and since the sections are identical, this comment
refers to section 4(f) hereafter in speaking of the protection of historic properties under
the transportation statutes. See Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act, 32 MD. L. REV. 327 (1973), for a technical and detailed discussion of the
legislative history and requirements of section 4(f).
122. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
123. Id. at 410, 420.
124. Id. at 411, 413.
125. Id. at 413.
126. Louisiana Environmental Soc'y Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1976).
In construing the statute in relationship to parkland (another type of property pro-
tected under section 4(f)) the Louisiana Environmental Soc'y court said
Congress articulated in § 4(f) a disparate weighting against the use of
parkland for highway projects . . . . This thumb-on-the-scale approach
is required whenever the parkland is to be used. If courts were to interpret
this section to permit an initial appraisal of whether the use was substan-
tial, it would infuse consideration of elements . . .
Id. at 84.
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under NEPA or NHPA.
Just how far the federal agency must go in seeking an
alternative and in meeting the requirement of "all possible
planning to minimize harm" has been spelled out in different
ways in the wake of Overton Park. In Louisiana Environmental
Society v. Coleman, 27 the Fifth Circuit concluded that a delay
of ten years before an alternative route could be approved was
not a cost of "extraordinary magnitude" or a "unique" problem
within the meaning of Overton Park. The view in Louisiana
Environmental Society sharply contrasts with the decision in
Coalition for Responsible Regional Development v. Coleman'8
where an alternative route was properly considered not feasible
when such alternative lay outside the traffic corridor encom-
passed by the project and the alternative route "would not
accomplish the objectives of the proposed project."'' 9 Thus it
appears that some courts take this higher duty more seriously
than others.
Although the standard of section 4(f) differs from that of
NEPA and NHPA, the mechanics of compliance are similar.
The Department of Transportation has issued regulations indi-
cating when the agency is required to prepare a 4(f) state-
ment. 30 The regulations also instruct the department official to
coordinate compliance with section 4(f) and compliance with
NEPA by submitting a combined EIS/4(f) statement. 3 ' If
NHPA also applies, the official may expand the EIS/4(f) docu-
ment to meet the Advisory Council requirements. 3 1
Other issues. Further comparison of section 4(f) with
NEPA and NHPA involves four additional issues. The first is
the meaning of "use" in section 4(f). Section 4(f) applies when
a Department of Transportation project "requires the 'use' of
any land from . . . an historic site . . ... "I The judicial opin-
ions differ as to whether an historic property has to be physi-
cally used in the project for 4(f) to apply; e.g., the building be
demolished or part of the site taken, or whether some construc-
tive use is enough to impose a duty under the act. In Hall
County Historical Society v. Georgia Department of
127. Id. at 85.
128. 555 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1977).
129. Id. at 401.
130. 23 C.F.R. § 771.19 (1979).
131. Id. § 771.19(f)-(g).
132. Id. 99 771.18(n), .19(b).
133. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
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Transportation,'34 the court rejected the constructive-use test
and instead required a showing of physical use. The fact that
a historic district listed on the National Register would argua-
bly be affected because a new road would run immediately
adjacent to the homes in the district was not enough to require
compliance with section 4(f).131
On the other hand, in Stop H-3 Association v. Coleman,
the Ninth Circuit applied the constructive-use test to an his-
toric site and determined that a highway that would pass near
a petroglyph rock would "use" the historic site within the
meaning of 4(f) .13 The court did not, however, provide a ration-
ale for its determination.
Where the constructive-use test is accepted, it is unclear
how difficult plaintiff's burden is to show such use. Further-
more, there is a question as to whether constructive use is
qualitatively different from "adverse effect" under NHPA or
"significant environmental effect" under NEPA. For example,
the noise pollution or vibrations from a nearby airport would
possibly be considered as having a "significant environmental
effect" on an historic site under NEPA and as having an
"adverse effect" under the Advisory Council's criteria. It is
unclear whether or not these "effects" would also constitute
constructive "use" under section 4(f).
Protected properties. Another difference between section
4(f) and NEPA and NHPA is the type of properties to which
they apply. The phrase in section 4(f) referring to "property of
national, state or local significance" indicates that 4(f), like
NEPA, provides environmental protection for more properties
than does NHPA; i.e., the property need not be on the National
Register to be covered by 4(f). Section 4(f) is, however, con-
fined to protecting properties which already have been desig-
nated as local or state landmarks or have been found to meet
the National Register criteria. The Libby Rod & Gun Club
37
case, in which the court required an EIS to consider as yet
134. 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
135. Id. at 750.
136. 533 F.2d 434, 445 (9th Cir. 1976). In assessing under section 4(f) a proposed
bridge which plaintiffs alleged would have an effect on the Georgetown Historic Dis-
trict in Washington, D.C., the court in D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972) said that if a federally assisted highway project will encroach on
historic sites, the Secretary "must determine before construction can begin that there
is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land." Id. at 1237.
137. 457 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mont. 1978).
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undesignated archeological sites, is evidence that NEPA poten-
tially reaches properties beyond those officially designated as
landmarks. Thus it appears that NEPA's reach is broader than
that of section 4(f).
The "cut-off" issue. The third point of contention is how
far advanced a federal highway project may be before it is too
late for a court to require the Secretary to find a feasible and
prudent alternative. The Fifth Circuit has held that section
4(f) may apply to ongoing projects. In language similar to that
applied to NEPA, the court in Arlington Coalition on Trans-
portation v. Volpe'38 said section 4(f) is applicable to an ongo-
ing federal highway project until it has reached the stage
"where the cost of altering or abandoning the proposed route
would clearly outweigh whatever benefits might accrue.""'3 The
court added that further "doubts about whether that stage has
been reached must be resolved in favor of the applicability" of
4(f).1' Even if a project has been underway a long time, a court
may still require strenuous efforts to mitigate harm to the his-
toric site or structure."' The foregoing interpretation is in keep-
ing-with most courts' view of NEPA on this issue and with the
recent trend in construing NHPA.
Judicial review. Finally, the fact that section 4(f) provides
greater protection to historic properties than either NEPA or
NHPA deserves some qualifying remarks. In spite of the high
standard it set for review of an agency decision, Overton Park
emphasized that when a court reviews the Department of
Transportation's compliance with 4(f), the Secretary's decision
that there is no feasible alternative or' that all possible mea-
sures to mitigate harm have been taken is entitled to a pre-
sumption of regularity."4 The burden of proof is on the party
138. 458 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th Cir. 1972).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In a mass transportation case, Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Or-
ganizations v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the efforts to mitigate harm
to the Reading Terminal when a'commuter rail tunnel was planned included a plan
to underpin the terminal structure to prevent harm from vibrations. The Urban Mass
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976), is worded very similarly to section 4(f),
requiring a "special effort" to preserve historic assets in the construction of urban mass
transportation projects. The section has a different standard however. Whereas section
4(f) requires "all possible" planning to minimize harm, the Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Act only requires all "reasonable" steps to minimize harm. This seems to be an
anomaly since the Urban Mass Transportation Agency is a part of DOT.
142. 401 U.S. at 415.
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charging noncompliance. The court added that this is not to
shield the Secretary of Transportation's action from a "thor-
ough, probing, in-depth review," but noted that the standard
of review is narrow.' The standard is the same as the one
applied in NEPA cases.'" Review is limited to determining
"whether the agency acted within the scope of its authority"
and "whether the decision reached was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."'4 Under both NEPA and section 4(f) the courts have
shown an extreme reluctance to reverse an agency decision or
to substitute a court-made plan for the agency official's judg-
ment.
CONCLUSION
The three major federal statutes that protect historic prop-
erties impose separate but interrelated duties on federal agen-
cies undertaking projects. Preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement as required by the National Environmental Policy
Act is a first step in agency compliance with the National
Historic Preservation Act and section 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act. Moreover, the regulations governing the
last two statutes require coordination with NEPA.
While the EIS serves as a vehicle for compliance, it does
not end federal responsibility under section 106 of NHPA and
section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. Unlike
the other laws, NHPA requires inclusion of the Advisory Coun-
cil on Historic Preservation in the review process and in the
search for an alternative to harming the historic resource or for
mitigation measures. Section 4(f) also differs from the other
historic preservation laws by requiring that an agency adopt
any feasible and prudent alternative that can be identified. If
no such alternative exists, then the act requires the agency to
engage in all possible planning to mitigate the adverse effect
on the historic property.
While all three statutes involve a balancing process in ar-
riving at an agency decision about the project, section 4(f)
requires that historic preservation always be accorded a higher
value than economic, technical and other considerations. The
other two statutes only require the agency to make a good faith
143. Id. at 415-16.
144. See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text supra.
145. 401 U.S. at 414.
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effort to consider historic preservation in weighing all the fac-
tors. Under NHPA and NEPA the agency apparently is free to
give non-environmental factors a somewhat heavier weight in
arriving at a decision than can be given under section 4(f).
Courts have interpreted all three statutes as applicable
even after a project has been finally approved and have granted
injunctions halting projects while the federal agency made the
appropriate review, but until very recently they have been
more willing to cause a delay under NEPA while an EIS is
prepared than to require the agency to involve the Advisory
Council under NHPA. NHPA compliance has been foreclosed
when a final decision, in the form of a binding contract, has
already been made regarding disposition of an historic property
before it was declared eligible for the National Register. Sec-
tion 4(f), like NEPA, has been interpreted as imposing duties
until quite late in the project, but the specific cut-off time has
not been spelled out.
In view of the varying standards imposed by these stat-
utes, Congress should consider whether it is reasonable to place
a higher value on historic and cultural resources than on eco-
nomic and social factors in the transportation context and not
to assure these same resources the same importance where
other federal projects are proposed. If a "special effort"'"4 was
believed necessary when section 4(f) was passed to protect his-
toric places threatened by the national highway building pro-
gram, the question remains whether a "special effort" should
be deemed necessary in the face of other federal programs
equally threatening to historic properties. Increasing public
awareness of the disappearance of landmarks may result in
citizen pressure on legislators to create greater uniformity of
standards among these preservation statutes, with the aim of
bringing NEPA and NHPA up to the higher standard of section
4(f), "'47 and in view of the considerable confusion that applica-
tion of these laws has caused, a legislative attempt to coordi-
nate and simplify them is needed.
Marilyn Ursu Bauriedel
146. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).
147. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), there is avidence of a growing interest in
historic preservation. Many communities are beginning to press for stricter landmark
statutes at the local level. See 6 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 247 (1978).
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